In this episode I am joined by our close partner at Attain Portfolio Advisors Jeff Malec and Mutiny Fund CIO Jason Buck.
Now that we’ve had the Mutiny Fund’s first full quarter in the books, Q3 2020, we wanted to get on a podcast and talk through the environment as a way of helping current and potential investors better understand what we do.
We’ll look to do these every quarter or so as a sort of modern version of the hedge fund ‘quarterly letter’ but where we can go into a bit more detail.
Q3 saw The S&P up about 8.28%, and the VIX down about -14% though it took a somewhat different path.
We wanted to release this publicly so we don’t go into specific performance here, but accredited investors can contact us at info@mutinyfund.com for more information or submit an inquiry on our site.
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Have comments about the show, or ideas for things you’d like Taylor and Jason to discuss in future episodes? We’d love to hear from you at info@mutinyfund.com.
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Transcription
Taylor:
Hello and welcome. I’m Taylor Pearson, and this is the Mutiny Podcast. This podcast is an open-ended exploration of topics relating to growing and preserving your wealth, including investing, markets, decision-making under opacity, risk, volatility, and complexity. This podcast is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment or tax advice. All opinions expressed by podcast participants are solely their own opinions and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of RCM Alternatives, Mutiny Fund, their affiliates or companies featured.
Taylor:
Due to industry regulations, participants on this podcast are instructed to not make specific trade recommendations, nor reference past or potential profits, and listeners are reminded that managed futures, commodity trading, Forex trading, and other alternative investments are complex and carry a risk of substantial losses. As such, they’re not suitable for all investors. You should not rely on any of the information as a substitute for the exercise of your own skill and judgment in making such a decision on the appropriateness of such investments. Visit www.rcmam.com/disclaimer for more information.
Taylor:
In this episode, I’m joined by our close partner at Attain Portfolio Advisors, Jeff Malec, and Mutiny Fund CIO, Jason Buck. Now that we have had the first full quarter for Mutiny Fund in the books, Q3 of 2020, we wanted to get on a podcast and talk through the environment we saw in the markets as a way of helping current and potential investors better understand what we do and how we approach the markets. We like to do these every quarter or so, as a modern version of the hedge fund quarterly letter, but I think the conversational format let’s us do a little more detail and just talk through questions in a way that will hopefully be more clarifying.
Taylor:
Just to give some background context, Q3 saw the S&P up about 8.28%, and the VIX down about negative 14%, though it took a somewhat wonky path to get there. We wanted to release this publicly, so we won’t go into specific performance information here. But accredited investors can contact us at info@mutinyfund.com or submit an inquiry on our website. I hope you find this helpful, and thank you for listening.
Taylor:
So I’d love to just start and maybe have y’all give an overview of just what happened in the markets. Q3, 2020, what was the market environment like, obviously particularly the volatility market?
Jason:
Sure. Maybe I’ll start with going over our buckets again, the way we view our long volatility series. The primary bucket we use is our options bucket, which is just buying options. One of the biggest things when you’re buying options is you’re paying for your Greeks, and the biggest Greek being your implied volatility or Vega.
Jason:
So if you have an environment where Vega or implied volatility or the VIX index is coming back down, it makes it a slightly difficult environment for buying those options because the pricing of those options where you could be slightly directionally right and correct about which term the market’s moving in or direction the market’s moving in, you can have implied volatility coming down in the VIX index, which you pay for that lead in volatility when you’re buying those options. It tends to happen infrequently, but it tends to really happen after a major sell-off. The issue is you can’t really time when that’s necessarily going to happen.
Jason:
The other buckets we have around the periphery are VIX arbitrage and our short-term futures. So at the VIX arbitrage, most of the managers are playing the differential or the pairs trade between implied volatility and realized volatility. Normally, those are negatively correlated. If you have VIX up, it’s usually because the S&P is down and vice versa. So they have a negatively correlated trade, and they’re able to harvest that premium between the pairs trade.
Jason:
But once again, after you’ve had a major sell-off, you can now start to have VIX coming back down, and at the same time, S&P can be slightly down. So you have these … The negative correlation becomes a little wonky in markets after a major sell-off like we experienced in March. It’s the echo of volatility that we’ve talked about before.
Jason:
Then you have our short-term down capture with our futures markets. Those aren’t necessarily worried about implied volatility or realized volatility. They’re able to short intraday the markets around the world, but part of that trade is you need a trending market intraday, and they need to capture the meat of that move. Primarily, you need to finish on a low point for the day, but you want to get in earlier in the day. So it’s more of a timing risk, or you need markets to trend. So they can capture or not capture, depending on what the market’s giving them.
Jason:
So on an overall basis, these are the way we look at the structure of all of the trades for the different buckets, and then therefore, the portfolio as a whole. So if you have a market like we’ve seen, you have this echo of volatility happening after a sell-off, it makes it a bit of a headwind for a strategy like ours. But it’s a fairly known headwind, and these things happen from time to time in markets. Every strategy has a potential slight downside. But at the end of the day, we really like right skew or asymmetric trades. Well, we can handle a little bit of bleed, but we’re there to make money off the large moves and large sell-offs in S&P.
Taylor:
I think, yeah, as you were alluding to, we saw in Q3 August, we saw some volatility at market up, which is historically unusual. September saw some volatility down, market down. We can get into more details about the different strategies and how to interest them to perform in that environment. But, Jeff, did you want to add anything to that overview of the market?
Jeff:
Yeah, I think in more layman’s terms, the active long vol is looking to protect and capture change in expected volatility, unexpected. So they’re looking to capture unexpected volatility over what’s already expected by the market. So in options terms, if they buy an option for 10, they need that option to go to 15 or 20 or higher in order to make money if they’re buying that option. We’ll simplify all the option, Greeks and whatnot, and just say if the option’s at 10, that’s expecting a certain move to happen. Even if it goes down, but it’s within that expected range of what it was going down, part of the price of the option, that option is not going to go up in value.
Jeff:
So I think that’s a simplified way of talking about implied versus realized volatility. Implied is what’s expected in the pricing of the options, and realize dis what actually happens in the market, which can be less than was priced into the option. So I think what Jason’s saying there is to have this echo from the big up move where we saw down move. We were down three and a half, four percent in the S&P. That’s a somewhat big move.
Jeff:
In 2017, that would have been huge. That would have spiked the VIX probably to 30 or 40 or something. But coming off when we were down 30% in a month in March, a 3% move was expected and already priced into the VIX at 30. So a lot of what you saw was just the move being within what was expected, per the pricing of the volatility. So I’ll just follow up on, as Jay said, the short futures bucket can capture some moves, even in that scenario. But they’re the least certain of the buckets that we have, in terms of, they have to capture that timing just right.
Jeff:
Over time, they’re going to do that more often than not, but any one month, any one quarter, any one year, they could simply not capture it or the move of that down move might not set up properly for them. Typically, you want to see the market close at or near the lows of the day for it to work for those guys. A bad move for them would be something like the market’s down 1% during the day. It rallies back up even, or a little bit positive and then follows back down, goes down two or 3% and then closes down 1%.
Jeff:
So just this intraday choppiness will basically chop them up because they’re very low risk. They want to risk a very small amount of money and hope to capture the trend the rest of the day. So they’re going to have really tight stops, which is encouraged, and that gives them that long volatility profile. If they had huge stops or no stops at all, it would take on a short volatility profile.
Taylor:
Yeah. Maybe to give a specific example, we did some research. A VIX of 30 means option prices are reflecting 30% annualized volatility, which equates to roughly 2% daily move. So if you have a 1.5% daily move down in the S&P, you can still see volatility fall. Because even though it’s a negative move, it’s a smaller negative move than what the VIX is pricing. Whereas, as you said, in 2017, if the VIX is at 10 and you have a down 1.5% move, then that’s more volatility than the options market is currently pricing. The options market is reflected by the VIX, I should say.
Jason:
Yeah, and not to complicate it too much about, but I’ll try to simplify as much as I can. But the way the VIX is structured, it’s based on 30 day forward variance on the S&P 500, reflected in options pricing. All that means is it, like we said, implied volatility is looking forward to what the market expects, but not only is it a 30 day forward variance, it’s also then annualized, as Taylor said.
Jason:
So if you’re looking at a VIX of 32 to 34, or somewhere 30 to 40, the shorthand, the way we look at it is it’s based on annual variance. So that’s 252 trading days. The square root of that is 15.87. Let’s call it 16. So wherever the VIX is trading at, you can divide by 16 and that’ll give you the standard deviation, one standard deviation move on that daily basis.
Jason:
So if VIX is at 32, that implies a 2% move on a daily basis that’s within the realms of expected volatility. So anything less than 2% move on a daily basis is within the realms of expected volatility. Now, if you have a 3% move on a daily basis, that’s still within two standard deviations of expected volatility. So it’s not that much of a surprise for the VIX market either. So that’s the way to give you a shorthand of looking at VIX in general, to give you an idea of what it’s implying for the inner deviation on daily moves, both up and down.
Jeff:
I believe actually the VIX is calculated on 365 days, even though there are only 252 days. So there’s a little weirdness embedded in that calculation as well, but the main logic there still holds.
Taylor:
Then another piece research point I was going to bring up that we talked about internally is historically the VIX moves in the opposite direction of the S&P about 80% of the time. So it is unusual or atypical for them to move together, but not unexpected. Jeff, I know you looked into it. There’ve been two months in the past 30 years, we saw a larger decline in the stock market while the VIX also printed a negative value. That was November of ’08 and September of 2000 or September of 1990.
Taylor:
Then there’ve been about 14 months over the past 30 years, where the VIX was down and the market was also down more than the negative 1%. So on average, about every two years. So again, uncommon, but not unexpected. Then we wouldn’t expect it to happen two years like clockwork, or on average. Two years like clockwork, but it’s probably going to cluster a lot of those days, where 2015 and 1990.
Jeff:
Yeah. So, yeah, we ran that research. Unfortunately, the front month VIX futures index only goes back to around 2015. It’d be more telling to see that on that front month. The VIX itself is a amalgamation of the different timeframes, whereas the VIX futures actually has a set expiration and whatnot. So the VIX futures in September were actually down 9%, I believe, versus the VIX itself was down 15 basis points.
Jeff:
So a casual observer would just say, “Oh, the VIX didn’t really move, and the market went down.” But actually, if you’re trying to invest in the VIX and take that exposure, you would have been down about 9%. So yeah, those stats you mentioned were interesting. On a lot of those, as you say, it matches the direction 80% of the time. I’d say inside of that 20% of the time, most of that is really small moves. The S&P is down 50 basis points, and the VIX is down 50 basis points or something. So it’s even rare to see the S&P move more than 1% and the VIX to also be down.
Jeff:
Those tend to cluster. So we saw a lot of those in 1990. I got to go back and look at why that was the case. It may have been just that the data starts in 1990. There might’ve been some weirdness with the data. Then again, there were a few clusters in 2015, which I believe is when we … was sovereign debt crisis and all that. Or was it the US-
Taylor:
It was the Chinese devaluation.
Jason:
Chinese stuff.
Taylor:
Yeah, the Chinese devaluation spiked the market, from a low VIX point.
Jeff:
Yeah. So, both those make sense, and it seems that these kind of scenarios happen. Then the other one you mentioned, there were two others that were a larger VIX down move and a larger S&P down move. One was November ’08. I have to look what the other one was, but basically there were, as Jason said earlier, in the echo of some of these big volatility moves.
Taylor:
Yeah, and then Jason talked about some of the major buckets. Maybe we will just run back through those, if you want to add anymore coloring, as we talked about for the volatility arbitrage or getting in a fixed bucket, that the trade, as you said, Jeff, that would have worked there would have been to be short the front month of the VIX futures. That’s also a short volatility trade, right? You’re betting against volatility in the short term. When you tend to have a big event like March or whatever, you tend to have that spike in the front month. So you can’t be in short that front month, is a risky thing. That’s not what obviously we’re trying to do, but-
Jeff:
The dynamic VIX, the vol, those guys will have that trade off from time to time. But generally speaking, yeah, the higher the VIX is, or excuse me, the lower the VIX is, the more risky that trade is for that front month spike. To me, what really happened in September, especially, and towards the end of August is, what I … I’m a golfer. I call in golf terms, you had a two-way miss. So in golf, that means sometimes you’re hooking it, sometimes you’re slicing it, which makes it really hard to play the course because where do I aim? Do I aim left or right? I don’t know where it’s going to miss.
Jeff:
So for these dynamic VIX guys, that was the scenario during that period of sure, if implied is way overpriced and realized is coming in low, maybe I will go short that front month, hedge it with more contracts in the back months, and that trade can work out. It’s not as risky as it may seem. Or I might flip that trade. But in September, you had a few days where VIX was up, market was up. You had a few days of VIX down, market down, and you had a few mixed days, which is the more normal of market down, VIX up.
Jeff:
So that’s what I call that two-way miss of it was hard to actually see and position yourselves of, “Okay, what’s the next little cycle going to look like? Is it going to be normalized? Is it going to be some of this weird behavior? When it went back, when it goes weird, normal, weird, normal, it’s hard to trade. The good news is nobody’s blowing out or having huge losses here. They’re just saying, “Hey, we take small risks for this very reason. If things don’t go the right way and we get some weird price action, we get out and we wait for the next trade setup.”
Jason:
And to extend on what Jeff was saying, and that’s the interesting part is every strategy has some downsides where, like you said, they can have the two-way miss. Or these managers know where they could potentially get hurt. So the key to structuring those trades on a manager by manager basis is to have that asymmetry, to have that right skew, to know you only lose a little bit to make a bunch when you’re right. That’s why we find those managers that have those profiles of “lose a little to make a lot.”
Jason:
So there will be time to time when they lose a little. That’s the way we like to keep it, is keep those losses really small. There can be times in the markets when all of our managers are losing a little bit at the same time, and these kinds of things happen from time to time. But we really have that asymmetry of payouts when you have large sell-offs. That’s what we built the portfolio for. Another way to look at it, too, is so we’ve had … Some people would say, “Okay, after a March like sell-off, maybe I should take my tail insurance off of my portfolio. Maybe it’s not a good time to have it because I know I’m paying up a little bit more for it.”
Jason:
But what we never know after that sell-off is if VIX is in the eighties, there’s no way of knowing that VIX can’t go into the two hundreds. Or VIX goes in the eighties, it comes back into the twenties as we sell, but then it rips back up into the eighties or in the 120s again. You can’t time that tail insurance. So what we try to do at the portfolio level is try to minimize, like I was just saying, about this tiny losses.
Jason:
So if you could still hold the long volatility on your books and you’re rebalancing monthly with your implicit short volatility, like your stock portfolio, that’s what helps you to hold this insurance long-term because we’re trying to take very, very, very small paper cut losses to make sure we’re there for those very large sell-offs.
Jeff:
I think it’s important to note, too, that that’s a little bit different than just outright buying volatility because we’re willing to take small losses, but at the same time, each manager, each sub-advisor set up where they can make money on this environment on multiple different environments. So it’s not just a option buying profile where you’re guaranteed to lose money in a down fall, down VIX environment. It’s just, there’s the possibility that you can, and it’ll happen. It’ll happen in months, quarters, years. But the setup is that these guys are actively trading it and you expect them three out of 10, five out of 10, seven out of 10, something like that, to actually perform well in a challenging environment like this.
Taylor:
Then other thing I know we talked about with the dynamic options packets, as you were saying, Jeff, I think it’s good five out of 10 times. I know three to seven out of 10 times, it tries to work, which sometimes it’s not going to. I think part of what happened with the dynamic options was on the up days, when you should be making money on calls, vol was getting crushed. So you’re losing on the puts and the calls because the market’s going up, but not going up as much. This was priced into the implied volatility of the options, as we were talking about with the VIX at 30. Then on the down days, vol was barely going up or was going down in some cases, because again, it wasn’t moving as much as implied volatility was predicting, which is, as we said, uncommon, but not unexpected.
Jeff:
Yeah. We ran a couple of stats on there, and this is just the VIX short-term. So you had at the end of the month, you had the market down 3.8%. The VIX was a rather small, 8%, versus the beginning of the month, the market went down three and a half percent and it jumped nearly 14%, the VIX. So back to the end of the month, you have that down 3.8%, VIX goes up eight. So not a huge up move for that down move that you’d be expecting. Then the market rallies back up, almost gains all of that three and a half. The VIX only came down 4.8.
Jeff:
So you would expect in a more normal environment that as the market erased that gain, you’d expect that to eat away all of the spike that happened, plus some, and it only took a portion of that spike. The spike was smaller than you expected. So smaller up moves when the market went down, and less erosion, when the market went back up.
Taylor:
I think one other thing we talked about that is somewhat important to point out is this idea that that volatility declining and the market declining at the same time is unusual. It tends to have to give one way or another. If volatility keeps going downwind, if the VIX goes back to eight, then any spike in volatility is going to cause the vol to pop. Or if the market starts grinding higher again, you’re going to make on that side of the trade or the portfolio. But as we talked about, you’re going to have these periods like this, where you have months or multiple months in a row of volatility downmarket down.
Jeff:
Yeah. I think back to the golf analogies, my dad would call it a self-correcting putt. So the higher you hit it up into the break, the more it will break. Or the harder you hit it, the less it will break. So it’s a self-correcting thing, right? It can only go the same direction for so long until it has to normalize. Basically, the implied will come down towards the realized. So we actually saw in September was the realized came up to the implied. Usually we’re thinking that the implied has to come down to the realized, but the realized came up to the implied.
Jeff:
They can also meet in the middle. Everyone thinks of it in binary terms of either one has to come to the other, but they can both meet in the middle and meet halfway. So as time progresses, you’re going to have those two either meet in the middle, or one’s going to come meet the other, and then it’ll be more normalized. I think of it like a spring coiling and uncoiling. So the spring was super compact heading into the COVID. It popped out, everything exploded, took longer than many expected for that spring to come back together. Even some of that September was some of the weirdness of trying to compress that back together. Now we have, and I called it in a blog post two weeks ago, “the calm before the storm before the calm.” So this was the-
Taylor:
Or the storm before the calm before the storm.
Jeff:
Yeah. Sorry. This was the storm before the calm before the storm. The calm is when you compress that spring and then it explodes. So you sometimes need this little storm, this little weirdness, in order to get to that more normal period where vol will do as you expect it to. I’d want to add, just add real quick. I want to make it clear that it’s not necessarily needed for it to be a normal. It’s just, it’s more of a tailwind when it is.
Jason:
I was just going to add just to not even get into more complexity for our VIX, our managers, is that you can’t buy spot VIX. You’re trading the futures curve or term structure. So that can affect these trades as well. Like Jeff has mentioned, most people think that the forward of the curve drifts back down to spot, but you can actually have them both converge. You can have spot and forward converge, which is a little rare, but it happens over time as well.
Jeff:
Yeah. I think that’s important to also note of this VIX curve. Usually it’s in a contango, which is the further out months are more expensive than the closer months. So it’s a sloping left to right on a graph. The October futures is 15 and the June of next year futures is 17. The September of next year futures are 18, sloping upwards. This curve we have currently has contango going into next month because of the election and then backwardation, which is not common for the VIX curve. So if you look at them side by side, you have a nice sloping left to right curve and this ski hill thing on the other side, where it goes up and then sharply back down. So again, not unheard-of, not weird … or not unheard of, not uncommon, but unwelcome and just makes it harder to navigate that whole thing.
Jason:
Well, I wonder … not unheard of, I wonder, going back to your storm to the calm before the storm again, is this Clooney’s “perfect storm” is when you have this echo of volatility from the March event coming into one of the most contentious elections we’ve seen in a long time. That’s what creates a kink in the volatility curve, which is creating the wonkiness, for lack of a better term, we saw in August and September.
Jeff:
Yeah, I think so. I think if you give these VIX traders, though, that same curve 10 times, I think they do well with it. I think it’s a good opportunity set at the same time. But for sure, it’ll increase the vol … That kind of curve is going to increase the volatility in those sub-advisors returns. If you had that same curve for a year, they’d be a little bit more volatile in their gains and losses.
Taylor:
All right. I think that’s the main things we wanted to cover. Anything else y’all wanted to add that we didn’t talk about?
Jason:
Just to reiterate the way the long volatility series is built, is anything less than a negative 10% down move in the S&P can be viewed as noise. It’s very difficult to cover those moves, and it’s actually prohibitively expensive to cover those moves. We look at anything, once you start getting into a negative 20% move, that’s what we want to see really, a pickup in our long volatility series. Then once you start to see those negative 30 to 40%, that’s where we really like to see the convexity, where we start to accelerate into that move and more than cover on the other side, those S&P moves.
Jason:
So when we’re going through these kinds of markets, if you have a negative three to a negative 5% down month in S&P, and VIX is coming down, you could have a similar down month in the long volatility series. To us, it’s just noise. We’re really looking for those big sell-offs that you see, negative 20, negative 30, negative 40% down. That’s what we’re really trying to look to cover in this long volatility series.
Taylor:
I think we’re looking to cover that spread, that that’s really what impacts the long-term compounded wealth. The way we think about it is what are the strategies or the tools that are going to help people compound their wealth over the longterm. Avoiding those negative 40% moves is really important, but avoiding negative 3% moves, as you said, is mostly noise. There’s a really high cost associated with that. So focusing on those, the things that are more detrimental to the long-term compounded wealth and also more cost-effective to manage, we feel, over the longterm makes more sense.
Jeff:
Yeah. I’d add that if you focus on those shorter, smaller moves, you’re going to actually, I think most of it’s an opportunity cost as well. Not necessarily outright cost of, “Great. I grabbed this down three and a half percent move. I just spent all my ammo. Now I didn’t position myself for the down 13% move or the down 23% move.” You only have so many bullets in the gun, so to speak.
Taylor:
Right. If you sell your home insurance when there’s smoke coming out of the kitchen, if it turns out that it was just a burnt steak or something, then you’re fine. If it turns out that the kitchen was on fire, then you really are going to wish you hadn’t sold that insurance. You never know.
Jeff:
Yeah. I think one other good point to make, we were speaking with a client the other day. He’s like, “This launched right after the vol spike. It was planned way before that. But having seen this whole cycle now, is there anything you would have done different? Is it working as expected?” All that stuff. So I’ll let Jason weigh in there, but my answer was, “Yeah. I think it’s working exactly as expected. There’s nothing I can think of that we could’ve done or would’ve done differently.”
Jeff:
Obviously you could say, “Oh, well I would have turned this sub-advisor off that month because they lost 50 basis points for the portfolio,” but that’s like, yeah, we could have bought triple-leveraged Tesla calls as well.
Taylor:
Right, which is the correct trade, but that probably isn’t-
Jeff:
The right answer is if I had to do it over again, buy the triple-leveraged Tesla. But yeah, there’s nothing I can think of in terms of portfolio construction that that should or could have been done differently. Like we talked about, you can’t time the insurance. In a perfect world, you would have said, “Hey, yeah, VIX is at 80. We know it’s going to be 25 in six months time. Let’s put everything on hold and get back in at 25.”
Jeff:
But at the same time, there were June, a lot of sub-advisors did really well with a declining VIX. So there’s no science, there’s no map that says they can’t do well in a declining VIX. It’s just, their win percent is going to be a little bit lower. As I said before, their volatility is going to be a little higher in a declining VIX. But to cherry pick and try and say, “Well, we’re going to do this a little better, this little different during a declining VIX” is counter productive in my opinion.
Jason:
Yeah. I think that part of that is we all get tick fever and we look at temporally what’s happened, what have you done for me lately, or this last month when we have to look at longer cycles. As we discussed it, if we had started at the beginning of the year versus April 17th, it would have been a very different story. But what would we change? From my perspective, nothing. I think we’ve actually … It’s not only been within expectations. I think we’ve actually exceeded expectations, given the decline of the VIX and how the markets have had just a tremendous V-shape recovery since March, April. It’s been actually that acceleration to the upside in the S&P. I think our managers have done a phenomenal job on the long volatility series, given the environment since March, April this year.
Jeff:
Yeah. I keep half joking, but maybe I will put that out on Twitter, have a poll of like, “Hey, these guys started a long volatility fund here.” Just show the VIX curve and put a little dot there in the middle of April when it was at 70 or whatever. Say the poll could be, “How much do you think the fund is down?” 10%, 20, 30, 40% plus. I bet … We’ll do this. I bet you’re going to get most people think it would be down 40% plus when we’re talking single digits. So agreed, given that environment, well within expectations and the sub-advisors are doing what they do.
Taylor:
Thanks for listening. If you enjoyed today’s show, we’d appreciate it if you would share this show with friends and leave us a review on iTunes, as it helps more listeners find the show and join our amazing community. To those of you who already shared or left a review, thank you very sincerely. It does mean a lot to us.
Taylor:
If you’d like more information about Mutiny Fund, you can go to mutinyfund.com. For any thoughts on how we can improve the show or questions about anything we’ve talked about here on the podcast today, drop us a message via email on taylor@mutinyfund.com. Jason is Jason@mutinyfund.com. Or you can reach us on Twitter. I’m @TaylorPearsonMe, and Jason is @JasonMutiny. To hear about new episodes or get our monthly newsletter with reading recommendations, sign up at mutinyfund.com/newsletter.
